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1.

Introduction

Predictable statutory interpretation helps ensure the reliable operation of contemporary
systems of taxation. Tax liabilities that are not clearly expressed and articulated by legislatures
lead to over-reliance on litigation as a means to enforce and clarify legislative intent. For this
reason, modern legislatures continually amend and draft new tax provisions, reformulating
existing rules and introducing new ones to address ever-changing social and economic
environments. Moreover, legislatures also respond with amendments directed at judicial
decisions with which they disagree, as well as the transactions and arrangements at issue in these
cases. As these amended and new rules are then subject to application and interpretation by
revenue departments, taxpayers, tax advisors, and the courts, all of which legislatures may
respond to through further subsequent amendments, tax legislation at any given time can be
regarded as the recursive product of an ongoing dialogue.
At the same time, the proliferation of ever-more detailed provisions in tax legislation
greatly increases the complexity of these statutes. The consequent tendency toward textual
interpretation of tax legislation can facilitate tax avoidance that undermines the capacity of a tax
system to raise revenue in a manner that is fair or equitable. For this reason, tax statutes like the
Canadian Income Tax Act (ITA)1 typically combine detailed statutory provisions with more
broadly-worded anti-avoidance rules that deny unintended tax advantages that might otherwise
result from other statutory provisions. At the apex of these anti-avoidance rules stand general
anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) like section 245 of the ITA. Section 245 denies tax benefits
resulting from tax-motivated transactions that result in a misuse of other provisions of the ITA or
other relevant enactments, or an abuse having regard to these provisions read as a whole.
In order to “legislate” statutory interpretation, therefore, legislatures generally employ
two different approaches: enacting detailed rules in response to changing circumstances and
judicial decisions, while simultaneously directing courts to prevent abusive tax avoidance by
applying more generalized standards that require them to go beyond or behind the text of the tax
legislation in order to deny tax benefits claimed by taxpayers that conflict with the object, spirit
or purpose of these provisions. As this paper explains, judicial experience in Canada
demonstrates a tension between these two approaches, since the existence of detailed statutory
rules can make courts reluctant to apply a general anti-avoidance rule that requires them to
depart from the statutory text.
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This paper considers the GAAR in section 245 of the ITA as an example of legislated
statutory interpretation, explaining the origins and structure of this provision and the extent to
which it has shaped the interpretation of Canadian income tax law. Part II provides a background
to the GAAR, contrasting the textual and formalist approach to tax statutes that was traditionally
adopted by English and Canadian courts with the more purposive and substantive approach
adopted by U.S. courts as well as English and Canadian courts in the 1980s and early 1990s. Part
III explains the basic structure of the GAAR and the way in which Canadian courts have
interpreted key elements of this provision. Part IV reviews key tax avoidance cases after the
GAAR was introduced, illustrating a lingering affect of pre-GAAR interpretive approaches in the
post-GAAR world, from which the courts have only begun to depart. Part V concludes.
2.

Background

Judicial approaches to the application of tax statutes involve two interconnected aspects:
interpretation of the relevant statutory text, and characterization of the transactions and
relationships to which the statute applies.2 To the extent that taxpayers engage in tax-motivated
transactions that contradict the scheme or purpose of the relevant statutory text, these aspects are
necessarily linked since textual interpretive approaches are apt to characterize transactions
without regard to taxpayer motivations, while purposive approaches are more likely to
characterize or re-characterize transactions in light of the statutory scheme. As background to the
GAAR and its impact on the interpretation of tax statutes in Canada, the following sections
review traditional Anglo-Canadian and American judicial approaches to tax statutes, and
departures from the traditional Anglo-Canadian approach in the 1970s and 1980s.3
(a)

Traditional Anglo-Canadian and American Approaches to Tax Statutes

Following early U.K. tax decisions, Canadian courts originally adopted a narrow
approach to tax legislation, interpreting tax statutes in a strict and literal manner and resolving
any ambiguities taxing provisions in favour of the taxpayer. In his judgment in the House of
Lords 1869 decision in Partington v. Attorney-General,4 for example, Lord Cairns declared that
“the principle of all fiscal legislation” was that:
[I]f the subject sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be
taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the
other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject
within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the
spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be. In other words, if there be
admissible, in any statute, what is called equitable construction, certainly such a
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construction is not admissible in a taxing statute where you simply adhere to the
words of the statute.5
A little more than 20 years later, Lord Halsbury expressed a similar view in Tennant v. Smith,6
stating that:
In a taxing Act it is impossible, I believe, to assume any intention, any governing
purpose in the Act, to do more than take such tax as the statute imposes….
[I]nasmuch as you have no right to assume that there is any governing object
which a taxing Act is intended to attain other than that which it has expressed by
making such and such objects the intended subjects of taxation, you must see
whether a tax is expressly imposed.7
In 1922, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the same approach, stating that “[a] law
imposing taxation should always be construed strictly against the taxing authorities since it
restricts the public in the enjoyment of its property.”8
Together with this strict approach to the interpretation of tax statutes, English and
Canadian courts also adopted an approach to the characterization of transactions that assessed tax
consequences according to the legal form of transactions and relationships notwithstanding that
they may have been entered into primarily or solely in order to minimize taxes otherwise
payable. In the leading English case of Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Duke of
Westminster,9 for example, where the Duke of Westminster had deliberately entered into an
arrangement with his gardener to convert otherwise non-deductible remuneration into deductible
payments, a majority of the House of Lords upheld the Duke’s appeal against an assessment
characterizing the payments as non-deductible remuneration on the grounds that the legal
documents confirming the arrangement explicitly provided that the payments were not
remuneration and that the gardener was not prevented from “being entitled to and claiming full
remuneration for such further work as you may do” – though the document also stated that “it is
expected that in practice you will be content with the provision which is being legally made for
you for so long as the deed takes effect with the addition of such sum, if any, as may be
necessary to bring the total periodical payments while you are still in the Duke’s service up to
the amount of the salary or wages which you have lately been receiving.”10
Rejecting the Commissioner’s argument that the payments were in substance nondeductible remuneration, Lord Tomlin held that “the substance is that which results from the
legal rights and obligations of the parties ascertained upon ordinary legal principles,”11 and
rejected the “supposed doctrine” that a Court may “ignore the legal position and regard what is
called ‘the substance of the matter’” on the basis that that “the doctrine seems to involve
substituting ‘the incertain and crooked cord of discretion’ for ‘the golden and streight metwand
5
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of the law.’”12 Concurring, Lord Russell of Killowen drew a clear connection between the
characterization of transactions and relationships for tax purposes and the interpretation of tax
statutes, criticizing “the doctrine that in taxation cases the subject is to be taxed if, in accordance
with a Court’s view of what it considers the substance of the transaction, the Court thinks that the
case falls within the contemplation of the statute” on the basis that “[t]he subject is not taxable
by inference or analogy, but only by the plain words of a statute applicable to the facts and
circumstances of his case.”13
In contrast to this Anglo-Canadian approach, U.S. courts adopted a more purposive
approach to the interpretation of tax legislation and a correspondingly more substantive approach
to the characterization of tax-motivated transactions that contradict the scheme or purpose of the
relevant legislation. In the leading American case of Gregory v. Helvering,14 for example, where
the taxpayer engaged in a tax-motivated corporate reorganization intended to distribute to herself
publicly-traded shares held by a private holding company without incurring any tax on the
distribution, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an assessment characterizing the reorganization as a
taxable dividend on the basis that the transactions were “outside the plain intent of the statute”
notwithstanding that they adhered to the text of the statutory definition for a tax-free
reorganization.15 Based on its purposive interpretation, therefore, the Court held that the
transactions were properly characterized as a taxable dividend rather than a tax-free corporate
reorganization.
Not surprisingly, as the Duke of Westminster case itself illustrates, the Anglo-Canadian
emphasis on literal interpretation of tax statutes and characterization of transactions and
relationships according to their legal form was highly conducive to tax avoidance.16 Although
English and Canadian courts were prepared to disregard “sham” transactions that are “intended
to give to third parties or the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and
obligations different from the actual legal rights and obligations (if any) which the parties intend
to create,”17 they would not re-characterize transactions like those in the Duke of Westminster
case that created real legal rights and obligations – even if these were undertaken solely or
primarily to avoid tax and were contrary to the object or purpose of the relevant legislation.
Instead, they consistently affirmed Lord Tomlin’s statement in in the Duke of Westminster case
that:
Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under
the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he succeeds in ordering
them so as to secure this result, then, however unappreciated the Commissioners

12

Ibid. at 19.
Ibid. at 24.
14
293 US 465 (1935) [Gregory].
15
Ibid. at 470.
16
See, e.g., Douglas J. Sherbaniuk, “Tax Avoidance – Recent Developments, in Report of the Proceedings of the
Twenty-First Tax Conference, 1968 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1969) 430-42 at 430-32
(describing literalism and formalism as the two “pillars of tax planning”).
17
Snook v. London & West Riding Investments Ltd., [1967] 1 All E.R. 518 at 528 (C.A.), per Lord Diplock. This
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of Inland Revenue or his fellow taxpayers may be of his ingenuity, he cannot be
compelled to pay an increased tax.18
The Anglo-Canadian approach to tax interpretation also had significant consequences for
the development of Canadian income tax law. Since courts were generally unwilling to interpret
statutory provisions in light of their purpose, legislative drafters developed a detailed and prolix
drafting style in order to prevent judicial misunderstanding – a process, as one Canadian
commentator explains, that became “self-perpetuating”, as detailed legislative provisions
encouraged courts “to conclude that the treatment of the subject is exhaustive, and that the
legislation is meant to say exactly what it says and does not mean to say anything that it omits.”19
Since courts were reluctant to include as income amounts that were not specifically identified in
the statutory text, Parliament responded with regular amendments designed to “plug the gaps”
created by restrictive judicial interpretations.20 As well, since taxpayers could rely on the literal
words of the statute and the legal form of transactions and relationships to plan their way around
the rules of the statute, Parliament introduced a multitude of specific anti-avoidance rules
(SAARs) designed to limit these opportunities.21 The result, as a prominent Canadian tax scholar
wrote in 1969, is “a hopelessly complex, unmanageable labyrinth”22 – a problem that is, of
course, more acute today, with the ensuing 50 years of amendments and elaboration.
In marked contrast to the Anglo-Canadian approach, U.S. courts relied on the reasons in
Gregory decision to develop broad judicial anti-avoidance doctrines in the form of a “business
purpose test” and “substance over form doctrine”. According to the former, tax benefits
otherwise available under the relevant legislation could be denied to taxpayers who entered into
transactions or relationships solely or primarily to obtain tax benefits not clearly intended by the
legislation.23 According to the latter, transactions should be characterized for tax purposes
according to their commercial or economic substance rather than their legal form.24 As a result,
although the judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Gregory had, like the judgment of the
House of Lords in the Duke of Westminster case, affirmed “[t]he legal right of a taxpayer to
decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means
which the law permits,”25 this right was not unfettered, but subject to significant judicial
constraints.
(b)

Departures from the Traditional Anglo-Canadian Approach in the 1970s and 1980s

Despite their initial adherence to the principles established in the Duke of Westminster
case, English and Canadian courts began to depart from this approach in the late 1970s and early
18
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25
Gregory, supra note 14 at 469.
19

5

1980s. In 1976, for example, the Federal Court of Appeal hinted at the development of a
American-style business purpose test, concluding that personal services corporations that
taxpayers had incorporated primarily for tax reasons could be disregarded as shams on the basis
that they lacked a bona fide business purpose. 26 In a trilogy of decisions in the early 1980s, the
English House of Lords developed a so-called “step-transactions doctrine” according to which
they could disregard purely tax-motivated transactions inserted into a preordained series of
transactions.27
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Canada formally rejected strict construction in Stubart
Investments Ltd. v. The Queen,28 affirming instead Professor Elmer Driedger’s so-called “modern
rule” according to which the words of an Act are to be read “in their entire context and in their
grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act,
and the intention of Parliament.”29 Two years later, in Golden v. The Queen,30 the Court
reaffirmed this conclusion, stating that:
In Stubart … the Court recognized that in the construction of taxation statutes the
law is not confined to a literal and virtually meaningless interpretation of the Act
where the words will support on a broader construction a conclusion which is
workable and in harmony with the evident purposes of the Act in question. Strict
construction in the historic sense no longer finds a place in the canons of
interpretation applicable to taxation statutes ….31
Notwithstanding this rejection of strict construction, the Supreme Court of Canada was
unwilling to abandon the traditional Anglo-Canadian emphasis on the legal character of
transactions and relationships regardless of whether they were entered into primarily or solely to
minimize taxes otherwise payable. Although acknowledging that “the taxpayer’s freedom to
carry on his commercial and social affairs however he may choose” must be balanced against
“the state interest in revenue, equity in the raising of revenue, and economic planning,”32 the
Court rejected the Minister’s argument that a tax-motivated series of transactions could be
ignored solely because it lacked “a valid business purpose”33 on the grounds that this would
contradict Parliament’s apparent intent to use tax incentives to encourage specific activities. 34 At
26

Minister of National Revenue v. Leon, [1976] C.T.C. 532, 76 D.T.C. 6299 (F.C.A.).
W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. Internal Revenue Commissioners, [1981] 1 All E.R. 865 (H.L.). [Ramsay]; Commissioners of
Inland Revenue v. Burmah Oil, [1981] T.R. 535 (H.L.); and Furniss (Inspector of Taxes) v. Dawson, [1984] All E.R.
530 (H.L.).
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1984 SCC 25, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 536, [1984] C.T.C. 294, 84 D.T.C. 6305 [Stubart].
29
E.A. Driedger, Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Butterworths, Toronto, 1983) at 87, cited in Stubart, ibid. at para
61.
30
1986 SCC 5, [1986] S.C.R. 209, [1986] 1 C.T.C. 274, 86 D.T.C. 6138 [Golden].
31
Ibid. at para. 10.
32
Stubart, supra note 28 at para. 53.
33
Ibid. at para. 9. The transactions involved a sale of the taxpayer’s business to a related company pursuant to an
agreement, whereby the taxpayer continued to operate the business as the purchaser’s agent, remitting the net
income from the business to the purchaser which used accumulated tax losses from prior years to shelter the income
from tax. After the accumulated tax losses were exhausted, the business was sold back to the taxpayer.
34
Ibid. at para. 55. According to Justice Estey: “A strict business purpose test in certain circumstances would run
counter to the apparent legislative intent which, in the modern taxing statutes, we may have a dual aspect. Income
tax legislation, such as the federal Act in our country, is no longer a simple device to raise revenue to meet the cost
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the same time, the Court suggested that “the action and reaction endlessly produced by complex,
specific tax measures aimed at sophisticated business practices, and the inevitable,
professionally-guided and equally specialized taxpayer reaction” might be reduced by an
interpretive approach that could, among other things, ignore the “formal validity” of a
transaction where “‘the object and spirit’ of [an] allowance or benefit provision is defeated by …
procedures blatantly adopted by [a] taxpayer to synthesize a loss, delay or other tax saving
device [.]”35 Otherwise, however, the Court concluded that “where the substance of the Act,
when the clause in question is contextually construed, is clear and unambiguous and there is no
prohibition in the Act which embraces the taxpayer, the taxpayer shall be free to avail himself of
the beneficial provision in question.”36
Despite its reluctance to disregard the formal validity of the specific transactions in
Stubart, subsequent Supreme Court of Canada tax decisions in the 1980s displayed a much
greater willingness to question the characterization of transactions and relationships according to
their legal form. In Johns-Manville Canada Inc. v. The Queen,37 for example, the Court stated
that the distinction between a current expenditure (which is fully deductible in the year in which
it is incurred) and a capital expenditure (the cost of which is generally deductible only over a
number of years) should depend on “a commonsense appreciation of all the guiding features” of
the expenditure,38 or “what the expenditure is calculated to effect from a practical and business
point of view rather than upon the juristic classification of legal rights ….”39
In Imperial General Properties Ltd. v. The Queen,40 where the taxpayer was assessed on
the grounds that it was “controlled” by and therefore “associated” with a family holding
company that held 90 percent of its common shares but only 50 percent of its voting shares,41 a
majority of the Court dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal on the basis that the holding company’s
ability to cause the taxpayer to be wound up on economically favourable terms gave it “[c]ontrol,
in the real sense of the term,”42 notwithstanding that it did not own a majority of the voting
shares. Although earlier Supreme Court of Canada decisions had generally interpreted the
of governing the community. Income taxation is also employed by government to attain selected economic policy
objectives. Thus, the statute is a mix of fiscal and economic policy. The economic policy element of the Act
sometimes takes the form of an inducement to the taxpayer to undertake or redirect a specific activity. Without the
inducement offered by the statute, the activity may not be undertaken by the taxpayer for whom the induced action
would otherwise have no bona fide business purpose. Thus, by imposing a positive requirement that there be such a
bona fide business purpose, a taxpayer might be barred from undertaking the very activity Parliament wishes to
encourage.” In a concurring judgment, Justice Wilson rejected the adoption of a business purpose test (at paras. 7172) on the grounds that it is “a complete rejection” of Lord Tomlin’s principle from the Duke of Westminster case
that taxpayers may order their affairs to minimize tax and that “Lord Tomlin's principle is far too deeply entrenched
in our tax law for the courts to reject it in the absence of clear statutory authority.”
35
Ibid. at paras. 63-64.
36
Ibid. at para. 64.
37
1985 SCC 44, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 45, 2 C.T.C. 111, 85 D.T.C. 5373 [Johns-Manville]
38
Ibid. at para. 41, citing the decision of the Privy Council in B.P Australia Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation of the
Commonwealth of Australia, [1966] A.C. 224 (P.C.) at 264, per Lord Pearce.
39
Johns-Manville, supra note 37 at para. 42, citing the decision of the Australian High Court in Hallstroms Pty. Ltd.
v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1946), 72 C.L.R. 634 (Aust. H.C.) at 648, per Dixon J.
40
[1985] 2 S.C.R., 288, [1985] 2 C.T.C. 299, 85 D.T.C. 5500 [Imperial General Properties].
41
The effect of this assessment was that the taxpayer corporation and the holding company were required to share
the amount eligible for a low rate of corporate tax under the “small business deduction” in ITA section 125.
42
Imperial General Properties, supra note 40 at para. 14.
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concept of corporate control as the de jure “right of control that rests in ownership of such a
number of shares as carried with it the right to a majority of the votes in the election of the board
of directors,”43 the Court characterized its approach as “the ordinary progression of the judicial
process,”44 and declared that:
In determining the proper application of [the relevant statutory provision] to
circumstances before a court, the court is not limited to a highly technical and narrow
interpretation of the legal rights attached to the shares of a corporation. Neither is the
court constrained to examine those rights in the context only of their immediate
application in a corporate meeting.45
While the Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in Johns-Manville and Imperial General
Properties demonstrated that the Court was increasingly willing to characterize transactions and
relationships in light of their commercial or economic reality, the high point of this substantive
approach was its 1987 decision in Bronfman Trust v. The Queen,46 in which the Minister
disallowed the deduction of borrowed funds used by the taxpayer to finance distributions to its
sole beneficiary on the basis that the funds were not “used for the purpose of earning income
from a business or property” as required by the relevant statutory provision.47 Rejecting the
taxpayer’s main argument that the borrowed funds were used indirectly to earn income from
property since they allowed it to “retain income-producing investments,”48 the Court held that
indirect income-earning uses are generally incompatible with the purpose of the provision to
“encourage … taxpayers to augment their income-producing capacity,”49 and that “a real
appreciation of the taxpayer’s transactions” did not support a bona fide indirect use since the
interest expenses on the funds borrowed by the trust greatly exceeded the income from assets
43

Buckerfield’s Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1964] C.T.C. 504, 64 D.T.C. 5301 (Exch. Ct.) at para. 10,
cited with approval in Dworkin Furs (Pembroke) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1967] C.T.C. 50, 67 D.T.C.
5035 (S.C.C.); Vina-Rug (Can.) Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1968] C.T.C. 1, 68 D.T.C. 5021 (S.C.C.); and
Donald Applicators Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1969] C.T.C. 98, 69 D.T.C. 5122 (S.C.C.). The Supreme
Court of Canada departed from this approach in Oakfield Developments (Toronto) Ltd. v. Minister of National
Revenue, [1971] C.T.C. 283, 71 D.T.C. 5175 (S.C.C.), concluding on facts similar to those in Imperial General
Properties, supra note 40, that common shareholders holding 50 percent of the voting shares controlled a company
by virtue of their ability to cause the corporation to be wound up on economically favourable terms.
44
Imperial General Properties, supra note 40 at para. 16.
45
Ibid. at para. 11. In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Wilson (McIntyre J. and Lamer J., as he then was,
concurring) acknowledged (ibid. at para. 35) that “the scope of scrutiny under the de jure test has been extended
beyond a mere examination of the share register in order to determine who really has voting control,” but insisted
that the Court’s decision in Oakfield, supra note 62, represented a “departure by the courts from a well-settled line
of authority” according to which “voting control is the proper indicium of control.” According to Justice Wilson: “I
am of the view, therefore, that the decision in Oakfield is anomalous and should not be followed. For the courts
suddenly to change direction in the face of well-settled and long-standing authority in our tax jurisprudence is, in my
view, quite inappropriate…. I do not think that this is a suitable area for judicial creativity. People plan their
personal and business affairs on the basis of the existing law and they are entitled to do so.” Imperial General
Properties, supra note 40 at para. 35.
46
1987 SCC 1, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 32, [1987] 1 C.T.C. 117, 87 D.T.C. 5059 [Bronfman Trust]. For a more detailed
discussion of the case, see David G. Duff, “Interpreting the Income Tax Act — Part 1: Interpretive Doctrines”
(1999), 47 Can Tax J. 464 at 489-494.
47
ITA, subparagraph 20(1)(c)(i).
48
Bronfman Trust, supra note 46 at para. 9.
49
Ibid. at para. 51. See also ibid. at para. 50: “… despite the fact that it can be characterized as indirectly preserving
income, borrowing money for an ineligible direct purpose ought not entitle a taxpayer to deduct interest payments.”
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that the borrowed funds allowed the trust to retain.50 The Court also rejected the taxpayer’s
alternative argument that it could have deducted the interest expenses if it “had sold assets to pay
the allocations and then borrowed money to replace them,”51 on the grounds that “courts must
deal with what the taxpayer actually did, and not what he might have done,”52 and that the
hypothetical transactions would be “the epitome of formalism” and might well be regarded as “a
formality or a sham designed to conceal the essence of the transaction, namely that the money
was borrowed and used to fund a capital allocation to the beneficiary.”53 With respect to each of
the taxpayer’s arguments, therefore, the Court bolstered its initial conclusions – that the
borrowed funds were not directly used to earn income and that the hypothetical transactions were
not carried out – with substantive arguments based on “a real appreciation of the taxpayer’s
transactions” and the “essence” of the hypothetical transactions.
In addition to these substantive responses to the taxpayer’s arguments, the Court’s
decision in Bronfman Trust also stands out for its explicit disapproval of the traditional AngloCanadian approach according to which tax consequences should depend on the legal form of
transactions and relationships regardless of their commercial or economic reality. According to
the Court:
… just as there has been a recent trend away from strict construction of statutes
(see Stubart … and … Golden…), so too has the recent trend in tax cases been
towards attempting to ascertain the true commercial and practical nature of the
taxpayer’s transactions. There has been, in this country and elsewhere, a
movement away from tests based on the form of transactions and towards tests
based on what Lord Pearce has referred to as a “common sense appreciation of all
the guiding features” of the events in question ….54
Welcoming this development as “a laudable trend provided that it is consistent with the
text and purposes of the taxation statute,”55 the Court concluded that this substantive approach to
the characterization of transactions and relationships could help to promote tax fairness by
limiting opportunities for tax avoidance:
Assessment of taxpayers' transactions with an eye to commercial and economic
realities, rather than juristic classification of form, may help to avoid the inequity
of tax liability being dependent upon the taxpayer's sophistication at manipulating
a sequence of events to achieve a patina of compliance with the apparent
prerequisites for a tax deduction.56
50

Ibid. at para. 52.
Ibid. at para. 9.
52
Ibid. at para. 53.
53
Ibid., citing Zwaig v. M.N.R., [1974] C.T.C. 2172 (T.R.B.), in which the taxpayer sold securities, used the proceeds
to purchase a life insurance policy, and then borrowed on the policy to repurchase the securities. According to the
Court: “The Tax Review Board rightly disallowed the deduction sought for interest payments, notwithstanding that
the form of the taxpayer’s transactions created an aura of compliance with the requirements of the interest deduction
provision.”
54
Bronfman Trust, supra note 46 at para. 48.
55
Ibid. at para. 49.
56
Ibid.
51
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As the Courts decisions in Stubart and Golden rejected the literalism of traditional AngloCanadian tax jurisprudence, therefore, its decision in Bronfman Trust challenged the traditional
emphasis that this tax jurisprudence had placed on the legal form of transactions and
relationships irrespective of their “commercial and economic realities”.
Despite these judicial developments, however, the Court’s rejection of a broad business
purpose test in Stubart convinced the federal government that a statutory GAAR was required to
direct courts to help prevent abusive tax avoidance. Explaining that “existing provisions of the
Income Tax Act are inadequate to deal with a number of blatant tax avoidance arrangements” and
that “a change in direction is required to reduce what was succinctly described by the Supreme
Court of Canada in the Stubart case … as the ‘action and reaction endlessly produced by
complex, specific tax measures aimed at sophisticated business practices, and the inevitable,
professionally-guided and equally specialized taxpayer reaction,’”57 the government proposed a
draft rule in 1987 “to prevent artificial tax avoidance arrangements” by introducing a business
purpose test and a step-transaction concept into the ITA.58 After more than a year of discussion
and commentary on the draft,59 the Canadian GAAR was enacted and came into force for most
transactions entered into on or after 13 September 1988.
3.

The Basic Structure and Interpretation of the Canadian GAAR

As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, the effect of the GAAR is to deny tax
benefits resulting from tax-motivated transactions that result in a misuse of other provisions of
the ITA or other enactments such as regulations or tax treaties, or an abuse “having regard to
these provisions read as a whole”. More precisely, subsection 245(2) of the ITA stipulates that:
Where a transaction is an avoidance transaction, the tax consequences to a person
shall be determined as is reasonable in the circumstances in order to deny a tax
benefit that, but for this section would result, directly or indirectly, from that
transaction or from a series of transactions that included that transaction.
For the purpose of this provision, subsection 245(3) defines an avoidance transaction as a
transaction that, but for the GAAR, would either alone or as part of a series of transactions result
directly or indirectly in a tax benefit, “unless the transaction may reasonably be considered to
have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax
benefit.” In addition to this provision, subsection 245(2) provides that subsection 245(2) applies
to a transaction only if it may reasonably be considered that the transaction would, if the ITA
were read without reference to the GAAR, result directly or indirectly in a misuse of any one or
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Canada, Department of Finance, The White Paper: Tax Reform 1987 (Ottawa: Department of Finance, 18 June
1987), reproduced in White Paper on Tax Reform (Don Mills, ON: CCH, 1987) 23 at 70, citing Stubart, supra note
28 at para. 67.
58
Ibid.
59
See, e.g., Brian J. Arnold & James R. Wilson, “The General Anti-Avoidance Rule — Parts 1, 2, and 3” (1988) 36:4-6
Can. Tax J. 829-87, 1123-85, and 1369-1410; and Howard J. Kellough, “A Review and Analysis of
the General Anti-Avoidance Rule” (1988) 36:1 Can. Tax J. 23-78.
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more of the provisions the ITA or other relevant enactments or an abuse, having regard to those
provisions other than the GAAR, read as a whole.
Together these provisions create three requirements for the GAAR to apply to a
transaction:
(1) the transaction or a series of transactions that included the transaction would, but for
the GAAR, result directly or indirectly in a tax benefit;
(2) the transaction cannot reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged
primarily for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit; and
(3) the transaction could, if the ITA were read without reference to the GAAR, reasonably
be considered to result, directly or indirectly, in a misuse of any one or more of the
provisions the ITA or other relevant enactments or an abuse, having regard to those
provisions, read as a whole.
The following sections consider each of these requirements, as well as the tax consequences that
may result if the GAAR applies.
(a)

Tax Benefit Resulting from a Transaction or Series of Transactions

Beginning with the concept of a transaction, subsection 245(1) defines this term
expansively to include “an arrangement or event”. Since a tax benefit may result not only from
an individual transaction, but also from a number of transactions, the GAAR also applies to tax
benefits that result from a series of transactions that includes an avoidance transaction.
Although the ITA does not define the concept of a series of transactions, subsection
248(10) extends the meaning of this term to include “related transactions or events completed in
contemplation of the series.” In this context, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that the
ordinary meaning of a series of transactions contemplates “a number of transactions that are ‘preordained in order to produce a given result’ with ‘no practical likelihood that the pre-planned
events would not take place in the order ordained’”,60 while the extended meaning includes
transactions completed before or after an ordinary series that are connected to the ordinary series
because they are completed “because of” or “in relation to” the series .61
The concept of a tax benefit is defined quite broadly in subsection 245(1) as:
60

Canada Trustco Mortgage Co. v Canada, 2005 SCC 56, [2005] 2 SCR 601, [2005] 5 C.T.C.215, 2005 D.T.C.
5523 [Canada Trustco], at para. 25, citing Craven v. White, [1989] A.C. 398 (H.L.) at 514, per Lord Oliver; and
Ramsay, supra note 27.
61
Ibid. at para. 26, citing David G. Duff, “Judicial Application of the General Anti-Avoidance Rule in Canada:
OSFC Holdings v. The Queen” (2003), 57 I.B.F.D. Bulletin 278 at 287. Although the conclusion that the extended
meaning of a series of transactions can include a subsequent related transaction has been criticized as a strained
interpretation of the words “in contemplation of”, the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed this interpretation in
Copthorne Holdings v. Canada, 2011 SCC 63, [2011] 3 SCR 721, [2012] 2 C.T.C. 29, 2012 D.T.C. 5007
[Copthorne] at paras. 50-58.
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a reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount payable under this Act
or an increase in a refund of tax or other amount under this Act, and includes a
reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount that would be payable
under this Act but for a tax treaty or an increase in a refund of tax or other
amount under this Act as a result of a tax treaty.
In contrast to more limited anti-avoidance rules, therefore, the scope of the GAAR is virtually
unlimited, applying to any tax advantage obtained under the ITA or a tax treaty, whether this
involves the deduction of an amount; the reduction, avoidance, or deferral of tax by any other
means; the reduction, avoidance, or deferral of other amounts payable under the Act, such as
interest and penalties; or an increase in amounts refunded to the taxpayer on account of tax or
other amounts such as interest and penalties.
Although this definition of a tax benefit may seem relatively straightforward, the notion
of a “reduction, avoidance or deferral of tax or other amount payable” or “an increase in a refund
of tax or other amount” implicitly assumes some notional amount of tax, refund or other amount
that would have existed but for the transaction or series of transactions.62 For this purpose, the
Supreme Court of Canada has held that a tax benefit may be identified by comparing the tax
consequences resulting from the transaction or series of transactions carried out by the taxpayer
with the tax consequences resulting from an “alternative arrangement … that ‘might reasonably
have been carried out but for the existence of the tax benefit.’”63 In cases where it is
unreasonable to conclude that the taxpayer would have carried out any transaction or series of
transactions but for the tax benefit, a tax benefit might reasonably be assessed by comparing the
tax consequences resulting from the transaction or series of transactions with the tax
consequences that would have resulted had the transaction or series of transactions not been
carried out.64 However determined, the Supreme Court of Canada has also held that the existence
of a tax benefit is “a factual determination, initially by the Minister and on review by the courts,
usually the Tax Court.,” and that the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to refute the “underlying
assumptions of facts” on which the Minister’s assessment is based.65
(b)

Non-Tax Purpose Test

Although a transaction or series of transactions may result in a tax benefit, the GAAR
applies only to avoidance transactions as defined in subsection 245(3), which explicitly excludes
transactions that “may reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily
for bona fide purposes other than to obtain the tax benefit.” Aptly described as “an expanded
version of the business purpose test” that the Supreme Court of Canada rejected in Stubart
62

See, e.g., McNichol v. Canada, [1997] T.C.J. No. 5, [1997] 2 C.T.C. 2088, 97 D.T.C. 111 (T.C.C.) [McNichol] at
para. 20: “There is nothing mysterious about the subs. 245(1) concept of tax benefit. Clearly a reduction or
avoidance of tax does require the identification in any given set of circumstances of a norm or standard against
which reduction is to be measured.”
63
Copthorne, supra note 61 at para. 35, citing David G. Duff, et. al. Canadian Income Tax Law, 3d ed. (Markham:
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2009) at p. 187.
64
Arnold and Wilson, “The General Anti-Avoidance Rule — Part 2,” supra note 59 at 1154-55.
65
Canada Trustco, supra note 60 at paras. 19 and 64. This conclusion was reaffirmed in Copthorne, supra note 61
at para. 34.
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Investments,66 this language excludes from the GAAR not only transactions carried out for bona
fide business purposes, but also transactions undertaken primarily for other non-tax reasons such
as family or investment purposes.67
As the Supreme Court of Canada has explained that the words “reasonably” and
“primarily” suggest that this non-tax purpose test is both objective and comparative,
contemplating “an objective assessment of the relative importance of the driving forces of the
transaction.”68 As a result, as the Federal Court of Appeal has held, “the focus will be on the
relevant facts and circumstances and not on statements of intention.”69 For this reason, the
Supreme Court of Canada has also concluded that the determination of whether a transaction can
reasonably be considered to have been undertaken or arranged primarily for bona fide reasons
other than to obtain a tax benefit is a factual determination, in which the taxpayer bears the
burden of disproving the “underlying assumptions of facts” on which the Minister’s assessment
is based,70 and emphasized that appellate courts should accord considerable deference to the
findings of the Tax Court judge, where these are “supported by the evidence.”71
(c)

Misuse or Abuse Requirement

In addition to the requirements that a transaction result in a tax benefit and cannot
reasonably be considered to have been undertaken for a bona fide purpose other than to obtain
the tax benefit, subsection 245(4) of the ITA creates an additional requirement that the
transaction must also result directly or indirectly in a misuse of one or more provisions of the
ITA or other relevant provisions or an abuse having regard to those provisions read as a whole.
This stipulation did not appear in the original draft version of the proposed rule, which
included a general interpretive provision indicating that the purpose of the section was “to
counter artificial tax avoidance.” In response to concerns that the original formulation of this
interpretive provision was unclear and that the anti-avoidance rule might apply to tax-motivated
transactions that are specifically encouraged by or consistent with provisions of the Act,72 the
interpretive provision was replaced with the misuse or abuse requirement in subsection 245(4).
As the Supreme Court of Canada has explained, its effect is to limit the scope of the GAAR to
abusive avoidance transactions, drawing a line between “legitimate tax minimization” to which
the GAAR does not apply and “abusive tax avoidance” to which it does.73
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Arnold and Wilson, “The General Anti-Avoidance Rule — Part 2,” supra note 59 at 1159.
Canada Trustco, supra note 60 at para. 33 (noting that the expression “non-tax purpose” has a broader meaning
than the expression “business purpose”).
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Ibid. at para. 28.
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OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. Canada, [2001] F.C.J. No. 1381, [2001] 4 C.T.C. 82, 2001 D.T.C. 5471 (F.C.A.) at para.
46 [OSFC].
70
Canada Trustco, supra note 60 at para. 63.
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Ibid. at para. 66,
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See, for example, David C. Nathanson, “The Proposed General Anti-Avoidance Rule” in Report of Proceedings of
the Thirty-Ninth Tax Conference, 1987 Conference Report (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1988) 9:127 at 2326.
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Generally regarded as “the most difficult” aspect of the GAAR,74 the characterization of
an avoidance transaction as abusive is ultimately a matter of statutory interpretation, in which a
court must first “determine the object, spirit or purpose of the provisions” that are relied upon in
order to obtain the tax benefit, and then decide whether the transaction defeats or frustrates this
identified purpose.75 Unlike ordinary statutory interpretation, however, in which the interpretive
enterprise is aimed at the meaning of the relevant statutory text, the first step of a GAAR analysis
seeks “the rationale that underlies the words that may or may not be captured by the bare
meaning of the words.”76 In this respect, the Supreme Court has stated:
The GAAR is a legal mechanism whereby Parliament has conferred on the court
the unusual duty of going behind the words of the legislation to determine the
object, spirit or purpose of the provision or provisions relied upon by the
taxpayer. 77
Once this object, spirit or purposes is determined, the Court has held, the second step of a GAAR
analysis will lead to a finding of abusive tax avoidance where: (1) a transaction achieves an
outcome that the relevant statutory provisions seek to prevent; (2) the transaction defeats the
underlying rationale of the relevant provisions; or (3) the transaction circumvents relevant
provisions in a manner that frustrates or defeats their object, spirit or purpose.78
(d)

Tax Consequences

Where the GAAR applies to an avoidance transaction, subsection 245(2) provides “the
tax consequences to a person shall be determined as is reasonable in the circumstances in order
to deny [the] tax benefit” that would otherwise result from the transaction or series of
transactions of which the avoidance transaction is a part. For this purpose, subsection 245(1)
defines the term “tax consequences” broadly as “the amount of income, taxable income, or
taxable income earned in Canada of, tax or other amount payable by or refundable to the person
under this Act, or any other amount that is relevant for the purposes of computing that amount.”
In addition, without restricting the generality of subsection 245(2), subsection 245(5) provides
that the GAAR may be used to (a) allow or disallow in whole or in part any deduction,
exemption or exclusion in computing income, taxable income, taxable income earned in Canada
or tax payable, (b) allocate any deduction, exemption, exclusion, income, loss or other amount to
any person, (c) recharacterize the nature of any payment or other amount, and (d) ignore the tax
effects that would otherwise result from the application of other provisions of the ITA.
Unlike more limited anti-avoidance rules, the scope of these remedial powers is
extremely broad, authorizing adjustments to any amount relevant to a taxpayer’s current or future
tax liability. At the same time, subsection 245(2) limits these powers in two important ways,
specifying that they must be determined “as is reasonable in the circumstances” and only “in
order to deny the tax benefit”. As a result, although the GAAR gives courts considerable scope to
74

Ibid. at para. 37.
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determine appropriate tax consequences for the variety of avoidance transactions to which the
provision might apply, its purpose is not to penalize taxpayers who engage in abusive tax
avoidance, but simply to deny the tax benefits that would otherwise result from abusive tax
avoidance transactions.
Because the tax consequences determined under the GAAR are those that are reasonable
in order to deny the tax benefit, moreover, the considerations determining the remedial effects of
the GAAR are necessarily related to those governing its application in the first place. In
particular, just as the characterization of an avoidance transaction depends on a “benchmark”
against which to identify a tax benefit, so also does the determination of “reasonable tax
consequences” to deny a tax benefit.
4.

Tax Avoidance and Statutory Interpretation after the GAAR

Since the GAAR applies only to transactions entered into on or after September 13, 1988,
the first case to consider the provision was not decided until 1997,79 and the Supreme Court of
Canada did not rule on its application until 2005 – when it decided two cases simultaneously,
applying the GAAR in one of these decisions,80 but not the other.81 Since then, the Court has
released only two more GAAR judgments in which the GAAR was applied.82 In addition to these
four cases, however, the GAAR has also been considered in a much larger number of lower court
decisions, in which it has been applied much less frequently.83
The following sections review key tax avoidance cases following the introduction of the
GAAR, beginning with Supreme Court of Canada cases involving pre-GAAR transactions and
lower court GAAR cases in the period before 2005, turning next to the first Supreme Court of
Canada GAAR judgments and their impact on lower court GAAR decisions, and finally
considering the Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent GAAR decision and its impact on more
recent GAAR decisions.
(a)

Tax Avoidance at the Supreme Court of Canada, 1988-2005

After the GAAR was enacted in 1988, one might have thought that the Supreme Court of
Canada would have followed the legislature’s lead by continuing to apply the purposive and
substantive approach that it had adopted in the mid-1980s to tax cases involving transactions
entered into before the GAAR applied. Indeed, the Court did exactly this in McClurg v.
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Canada,84 which was released in December 1990. Emphasizing that courts must “determine both
the purpose of the legislative provision and the economic and commercial reality of the
taxpayer’s actions” in assessing the tax consequences of particular transactions,85 a majority of
the Court held that an income attribution rule did not apply to dividends received by the
taxpayer’s spouse on the grounds that the purpose of the provision does not generally
contemplate dividends,86 and that its application on the facts of the case “would be contrary to …
commercial reality.”87 Over the next fifteen years, however, the Court rejected this approach,
returning to the more textual and formalist approach that characterized traditional AngloCanadian tax jurisprudence.
The first indication of this change was the Court’s 1994 decision in Antosko v. The
Queen,88 in which the Court held that the taxpayers were entitled to a deduction even if it
resulted in a windfall that was not intended by the relevant provision.89 Rejecting the Crown’s
argument that it would be contrary to the purpose of the provision to permit the taxpayers to
claim the deduction, the Court stated that the purpose of a provision and the economic and
commercial reality of a transaction “cannot alter the result where the words of the statute are
clear and plain and … the legal and practical effect of the transaction is undisputed.”90 The
following year, in Friesen v. Canada,91 a majority of the Court reaffirmed this “plain meaning”
approach to the interpretation of tax statutes, confirming a departure from the purposive
approach of Bronfman Trust and McClurg.
As with this shift from purposive to textual interpretation, so also did the Court’s
judgments in these years abandon its earlier emphasis on commercial and economic reality in
favour of a more formal approach emphasizing the legal character of transactions and
arrangements, rather than their commercial or economic substance. In Duha Printers (Western)
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Ltd. v. The Queen,92 for example, in which the taxpayer entered into a series of transactions
intended to circumvent a provision that generally prohibits the acquisition by unrelated persons
of corporate losses that can be used to shelter income from tax,93 the Court affirmed a narrow de
jure concept of corporate control arguably at odds with its earlier decision in Imperial General
Properties. Notwithstanding that the taxpayer acquired the shares of a company only a day after
issuing a majority of its own voting shares to the company’s sole shareholder, which entered into
a unanimous shareholder’s agreement depriving it of real or effective control of the taxpayer, the
Court concluded that the provision did not apply because the taxpayer and a company the shares
of which it acquired in order to obtain the company’s losses were both controlled by the same
person and therefore related immediately before this transaction.94
Emphasizing that “taxpayers rely heavily on whatever certainty and predictability can be
gleaned from the Income Tax Act,” the Court in Duha rejected the Crown’s argument that
corporate control should be broadly interpreted as actual control in favour of a “simple test”
based on de jure control.95 It also rejected the suggestion that the taxpayer should not be able to
benefit from tax-motivated transactions contrary to the object and spirit of the relevant provision
on the grounds that the Stubart decision established that “no ‘business purpose’ is required for a
transaction to be considered valid under the Income Tax Act, and that a taxpayer is entitled to
take advantage of the Act even where a transaction is motivated solely by the minimization of
tax.”96 Despite the GAAR, therefore, the Court was not only unwilling to extend its principles to
transactions entered into before this provision came into force, but was also unwilling to apply
the more substantive approach of its earlier jurisprudence in order to limit opportunities for
abusive tax avoidance.
In addition to Duha, other Supreme Court of Canada decisions during this period adopted
a similarly formalistic approach to the ITA, eschewing considerations of commercial or
economic reality and sanctioning tax-motivated transactions contrary to the object and purpose
of specific provisions or the ITA as a whole. In Neuman v. M.N.R.,97 for example, which was
released a week before Duha, the Court relied on its earlier decision in McClurg to hold that an
income attribution rule did not apply to discretionary dividends paid by a private corporation to
the taxpayer’s spouse, notwithstanding that she had made no contribution to the business (unlike
the taxpayer’s spouse in McClurg) and that the arrangement appears to have been purely taxmotivated in order to split income. Concluding that the attribution rule was limited in its scope
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and that the ITA contains “no general scheme to prevent income-spitting,”98 the Court also
emphasized that it was “important to remember that this Court held unanimously in Stubart …
that a transaction should not be disregarded for tax purposes because it has no independent or
bona fide purpose …” and that “taxpayers can arrange their affairs in a particular way for the
sole purpose of deliberately availing themselves of tax reduction devices in the ITA.”99
A year and a half later, in Shell Canada Ltd. v. The Queen,100 the Court sanctioned what a
prominent Canadian commentator denounced as a “blatant tax avoidance scheme”101 in which
the taxpayer engaged in a so-called “weak currency borrowing” – borrowing New Zealand
dollars at a high interest rate, converting these to U.S. dollars for use in its business, and entering
into forward currency exchange agreements to convert U.S. dollars back into New Zealand
dollars to make payments of interest and principal – thereby obtaining higher deductions on the
interest payments and partly taxable capital gains on the currency exchange agreements.
Concluding that the borrowed funds were used for the purpose of earning income as required by
the relevant statutory provision, the Court allowed the deduction of the increased interest
expense, notwithstanding that the sole purpose of the New Zealand borrowing was to reduce tax.
According to the Court:
... absent a specific provision to the contrary, it is not the courts' role to prevent
taxpayers from relying on the sophisticated structure of their transactions,
arranged in such a way that the particular provisions of the Act are met, on the
basis that it would be inequitable to those taxpayers who have not chosen to
structure their transactions that way.... Unless the Act provides otherwise, a
taxpayer is entitled to be taxed based on what it actually did, not based on what it
could have done, and certainly not based on what a less sophisticated taxpayer
might have done.102
Most significant, perhaps, is the Court’s 2001 decision in Ludco Enterprises Ltd. v. The
Queen, in which the taxpayers sought to deduct interest on borrowed funds used to acquire
shares of two offshore companies that used the funds to purchase debt-securities and reinvest
almost all profits, paying dividends that were much less than the interest expenses on the
borrowed funds, which enabled the taxpayers to use the deduction to shelter other income from
tax.104 Rejecting the Crown’s argument that the real purpose for which the borrowed funds were
103
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used was to realize partly-taxable capital gains when shares of the companies were sold, not
income from a business or property as required by the relevant statutory provision, the Court
allowed the deduction on the grounds that borrowed funds can be used to earn gross income not
net income,105 and that the borrowed funds were used to earn at least some income in the form of
dividends even if the primary purpose was to realize capital gains.106 More generally, the Court
stated:
… given that the Income Tax Act has many specific anti-avoidance provisions and
rules, it follows that courts should not be quick to embellish the provisions of the
Act in response to concerns about tax avoidance when it is open to Parliament to
be precise and specific with respect to any mischief to be prevented …. To do
otherwise would be to fail to give appropriate weight to the well-established
principle that, absent a provision to the contrary, taxpayers are entitled to arrange
their affairs for the sole purpose of achieving a favourable position regarding
taxation ….107
As a result, the Court suggested, even if a specific statutory provision might be
interpreted to discourage or prevent tax avoidance, courts should forswear such an interpretation
on the grounds that taxpayers are entitled to arrange their affairs solely to minimize taxes absent
a precise and specific statutory anti-avoidance provision to the contrary. Contrary to the GAAR,
therefore, and in contrast to the Court’s decisions in Stubart and Bronfman Trust, which assumed
at least some judicial responsibility to limit tax avoidance,108 this passage suggested that tax
avoidance was properly a matter for the legislature, not the courts. In fact, the legislature
responded to each of the decisions in Duha, Neuman, Shell, and Ludco with specific antiavoidance rules109 – though not always quickly and not always successfully, resulting in
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undetermined revenue losses. 110 And the Court’s hands off attitude to tax avoidance during this
period encouraged tax advisors and their clients to carry on devising and implementing
aggressive tax avoidance strategies, which the Canadian tax system continues to address.
(b)

Lower Court GAAR Cases, 1997-2005

By the time that the Supreme Court of Canada released its decisions in Duha, Neuman,
Shell, and Ludco, lower courts had begun to rule on cases involving the GAAR. Although a few
of these cases adopted a narrow interpretive approach, relying on pre-GAAR jurisprudence to
assess transactions subject to the GAAR,111 others took a broader view, concluding that tax
avoidance transactions were subject to the GAAR on the grounds that they either misused
specific provisions of the ITA or abused a more general statutory scheme.
In the first two GAAR cases, for example,112 the Tax Court of Canada concluded that taxmotivated “surplus stripping” transactions designed to convert otherwise taxable dividends into
lower-taxed capital gains, were contrary to the scheme of the ITA, which generally “calls for the
treatment of distributions to shareholders of corporate property as income.”113 According to the
second of these judgments:
… the Income Tax Act, read as a whole, envisages that a distribution of corporate
surplus to shareholders is to be taxed as a payment of dividends. A form of
transaction that is otherwise devoid of any commercial objective, and that has as
its real purpose the extraction of corporate surplus and the avoidance of the
ordinary consequences of such a distribution, is an abuse of the Act as a whole.114
Similarly in Duncan v. Canada,115 where a partnership attempted to take advantage of a
gap in Canadian tax rules to claim a loss on the disposition of an obsolete computer that had been
written down for U.S. tax purposes while the partnership carried on business in the United States
but was valued at its original cost for Canadian tax purposes, the Federal Court of Appeal
applied the GAAR to disallow the loss on the basis that this outcome would be “contrary to the
scheme of the capital cost allowance provisions which limits the deduction of capital
expenditures to those incurred for the purpose of earning income under the Act.”116 The Court
also rejected the taxpayer’s argument that a subsequent amendment that would have denied the
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loss confirmed that the transactions were not abusive before this change,117 concluding that “this
amendment demonstrates that Parliament moved as quickly as it could to close the loophole
exploited by the appellants precisely because the result achieved was anomalous having regard to
the object and spirit of the relevant provisions of the Act.”118
The most important GAAR case during this period is OSFC Holdings Ltd. v. Canada,119
in which the Federal Court of Appeal applied the GAAR to a series of transactions by means of
which the taxpayer sought to deduct accrued losses on the disposition of property originally
owned by an unrelated corporation. In order to transfer these losses, the acquisition of which by
the taxpayer would have been prevented by specific anti-avoidance rules if the taxpayer had
acquired control of the unrelated corporation directly,120 the corporation first transferred the
property to a related partnership, the taxpayer then purchased the corporation’s interest in the
partnership, and the partnership ultimately disposed of the property thereby realizing the losses.
Under a so-called “stop-loss” rule that prevents taxpayers from realizing tax losses when they do
not dispose of their economic interest in property, the losses were denied when the corporation
transferred the property to the related partnership and added the cost of the property to the
partnership,121 effectively preserving the accrued losses in the hands of the partnership. When the
taxpayer acquired the corporation’s interest in the partnership and the partnership then disposed
of the property, these losses flowed through to the taxpayer under ITA rules for allocating income
and losses to members of partnerships.122
Concluding that the transactions comprised an extended series of transactions that
resulted in a tax benefit when the taxpayer deducted the losses,123 and that the taxpayer’s
acquisition of the corporation’s partnership interest was primarily tax-motivated,124 the Court’s
main contribution to judicial interpretation of the GAAR is its analysis of the misuse or abuse
test in subsection 245(4) of the ITA.125 For a misuse analysis, the Court concluded, courts must
consider the “policy behind” specific provisions of the ITA.126 An abuse analysis, on the other
hand, requires “a consideration of the avoidance transactions in a wider context, having regard to
the provisions of the Income Tax Act read as a whole and the policy behind them.”127 In each
case, the Court reasoned that because the GAAR requires courts to go “behind” the word of the
117
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statute – “invoking a policy to override the words that Parliament has used” – courts should
“proceed cautiously” in carrying out “the unusual duty” imposed upon by the GAAR,
determining that a transaction has resulted in a misuse or abuse only where the relevant policy is
“clear and unambiguous.”128 As a result, it emphasized:
… subsection 245(4) cannot be viewed as abdication by Parliament of its role as
lawmaker in favour of the subjective judgment of the Court or particular judges.
In enacting subsection 245(4), Parliament has placed the duty on the Court to
ascertain Parliament’s policy, as the basis for denying a tax benefit from a
transaction that otherwise would meet the requirements of the statute. Where
Parliament has not been clear and unambiguous as to its intended policy, the
Court cannot make a finding of misuse or abuse, and compliance with the statute
must govern.129
Turning to the specific provisions themselves, the Court held that the transactions had not
misused the specific stop-loss rule that allowed the corporation to transfer the accrued losses to
the partnership,130 but had abused the statutory scheme, which generally prohibits the transfer of
losses from one corporation to an unrelated corporation.131 As a result, the Court applied the
GAAR to deny the loss.
(c)

Mathew, Canada Trustco, and Lower Court GAAR Cases, 2005-2013

When the Supreme Court of Canada finally ruled on the GAAR in 2005, it released two
judgments simultaneously, applying the provision in one case but not in the other.132 In
Mathew,133 which involved the same transactions as OSFC, the Court applied the GAAR to
disallow the deduction of losses by individual investors who acquired partnership interests from
OSFC on the basis that use of the stop-loss rule to transfer accrued losses to any unrelated person
was contrary to the purpose of this provision to deny a loss and preserve it “under the assumption
that it will be realized by a taxpayer who does not deal at arm’s length with the transferor.”134 In
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Canada Trustco,135 which involved a complicated series of circular transactions that allowed the
taxpayer to deduct capital cost allowance (CCA) on assets that it acquired at little real economic
cost and immediately leased back to the vendor, the Court rejected the Crown’s argument that
the transactions “contravened the object, spirit or purpose of the CCA regime”136 on the grounds
that these provisions generally allow deductions based on the legal cost of capital assets
irrespective of their real economic cost and depart from this rule only in specifically limited
circumstances. 137
While the Court’s purposive interpretation of the stop-loss rule in Mathew was a
welcome correction to the “narrow textual analysis” of this provision in OSFC,138 its
unwillingness in Canada Trustco to look behind the CCA rules to discern an underlying policy
of limiting deductions to the real economic cost of capital assets was an unfortunate departure
not only from the purposive approach it adopted in Mathew, but also from the more wide-ranging
abuse analysis that the Federal Court of Appeal endorsed in OSFC. Indeed, although the Court
explicitly endorsed a more contextual and purposive approach to the interpretation of tax
legislation,139 it also rejected a broad abuse analysis on the grounds that any “search for an
overriding policy” of the ITA that is not based on “a unified, textual, contextual and purposive
interpretation of the specific provisions” relied upon to obtain a tax benefit would
“inappropriately place the formulation of taxation policy in the hands of the judiciary, requiring
judges to perform a task to which they are unaccustomed and for which they are not equipped”
and “run counter to the overall policy of Parliament that tax law be certain, predictable and fair,
so that taxpayers can intelligently order their affairs.”140
For these reasons, notwithstanding the text of subsection 245(4) which clearly
distinguishes between a “misuse of … provisions” and an “abuse having regard to those
provisions … read as a whole,” the Court concluded that this provision does not contemplate
“separate inquiries” as the Federal Court of Appeal had held in OSFC, but “requires a single,
unified approach to the textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of the specific provisions
of the Income Tax Act that are relied upon by the taxpayer in order to determine whether there
was abusive tax avoidance.”141 As well, despite amendments to subsection 245(4) that replaced
the original “double negative” language stipulating that the GAAR did not apply to a transaction
where it was reasonable to conclude that the transaction would not result in a misuse or abuse
with language providing that the GAAR “applies to a transaction” if “it may reasonably be
considered” that it would result in a misuse or abuse,142 the Court adopted the view of the
135
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Federal Court of Appeal in OSFC that “the GAAR can only be applied to deny a tax benefit
when the abusive nature of the transaction is clear.”143
As a result, although the Court’s decisions in Mathew and Canada Trustco demonstrated
a departure from the textualism and formalism that characterized the Court’s tax judgments in
the 1990s and early 2000s, this change was limited, since the Court was unwilling to engage in a
broad analysis of the policy underlying a statutory scheme, limited the scope of the abuse
analysis under subsection 245(4) to “the specific provisions” relied upon to obtain a tax benefit,
and imposed a high standard of “clear and unambiguous” abuse on the misuse or abuse
requirement of the GAAR. Indeed, despite affirming a “textual, contextual and purposive”
approach to the interpretation of tax statutes, the Court also observed that the ITA is “dominated
by explicit provisions dictating specific consequences, inviting a largely textual
interpretation.”144 Similarly, although recognizing that the GAAR limits the scope of the Duke of
Westminster principle that taxpayers may “manage their affairs” to minimize taxes payable,145
the Court also emphasized that the GAAR was not intended to repeal the Duke of Westminster
principle altogether,146 but rather to “draw … a line between legitimate tax minimization and
abusive tax avoidance,”147 thereby preserving “predictability, certainty and fairness in Canadian
tax law.”148 In these respects, the legacy of textual and formalist statutory interpretation, which
the Supreme Court of Canada reaffirmed in the 1990s and early 2000s, continued to influence the
Court’s interpretation of the GAAR.
Not surprisingly, the decisions in Matthew and Canada Trustco had a significant impact
on lower court decisions involving the GAAR, as courts became much more reluctant to
conclude that avoidance transactions were abusive on the basis that they contravened a policy
underlying a statutory scheme. In Evans v. Canada,149 for example, where the taxpayer engaged
in a series of transactions designed to distribute corporate surpluses with little or no tax, the court
dismissed the Crown’s argument that the transactions were an abusive “surplus strip” on the
grounds that the specific provisions relied upon by the taxpayer operated as intended and “the
only basis upon which [it] could uphold the Minister’s application of section 245 would be to
find that there is some overarching principle of Canadian tax law that requires that corporate
distributions must be taxed as dividends” which is “precisely what the Supreme Court of Canada
has said we cannot do.”150 In Collins & Aikman Products Co. v. Canada,151 where the taxpayer
relied on a gap in Canadian tax rules to carry out a corporate reorganization that allowed it to
increase the equity of a Canadian subsidiary and extract over $100 million of corporate surplus
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without paying non-resident withholding tax on dividends,152 the court also dismissed the
Crown’s argument that the transactions abused a statutory scheme against surplus stripping,
concluding instead that the provision on which the taxpayer relied was itself part of the statutory
scheme,153 and that the GAAR cannot be used “to fill in … a possible gap left by Parliament.”154
Similarly, in Landrus v. The Queen,155 where the taxpayer deducted a loss resulting from
the disposition of property from one partnership in which he held an interest to another in which
he also held an interest, the court rejected the Crown’s argument that the transactions, which
were not subject to any of the specific stop-loss rules in the ITA, contravened a “general policy”
to disallow losses resulting from dispositions of property among related persons and within the
same economic unit on the grounds that the specific nature of the various stop-loss rules in the
ITA did not evidence any such underlying policy, but instead indicated that these rules were
exceptions to a general policy to recognize losses on all dispositions.156 And in Gwartz v.
Canada,157 where the taxpayer engaged in a series of transactions designed to circumvent a tax
on split-income that was introduced in response to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Neuman,158 the court dismissed the Crown’s argument that the transactions were abusive on the
grounds that “a broad policy … against income splitting … has not been recognized,”159 that the
GAAR cannot be used “to deny a tax benefit resulting from a taxpayer’s reliance on a previously
unnoticed legislative gap,”160 and that subsequent amendments that closed this legislative gap
demonstrated a change in the underlying policy of the provision rather than a confirmation that
the transactions were abusive at the time.161
(d)

Lipson, Copthorne, and Beyond

While these decisions illustrate how the Supreme Court of Canada’s initial rulings on the
GAAR narrowed the scope of this provision, the Court’s subsequent decisions in Lipson162 and
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Copthorne163 appear to have opened the door to the kind of broader policy arguments that the
Court dismissed in Canada Trustco.
The first of these cases involved a series of transactions in which the taxpayer’s spouse
deducted interest on borrowed funds that she used to purchase shares of a family company from
the taxpayer, who used the proceeds from the sale of the shares to purchase a personal residence.
Although the share sale would normally have resulted in a taxable capital gain, the taxpayer
relied on a “rollover” rule for transfers of property between spouses and common-law partners to
defer tax on the gain,164 as a consequence of which income attribution rules provide that any
income, gain or loss on the transferred shares are attributed to the taxpayer.165 Since the company
paid very little in the way of dividends, the interest expense incurred by the taxpayer’s spouse
exceeded this income, resulting in a net loss which was attributed to the taxpayer, allowing him
to shelter other income from tax.
Emphasizing that “the Duke of Westminster principle has never been absolute,”166 and
adding that the standard for establishing that a transaction results in a misuse or abuse is “on the
balance of probabilities” (not a “clear and unambiguous” standard),167 the Court held that the
transactions were contrary to the purpose of the income attribution rule since they enabled the
taxpayer to reduce his taxes by using a rule that is intended “to prevent spouses from reducing
tax by taking advantage of their non-arm’s length relationship when transferring property.”168 As
a result, the Court concluded:
… the attribution … that allowed Mr. Lipson to deduct the interest in order to
reduce the tax payable on the dividend income from the shares and other income,
which he would not have been able to do were Mrs. Lipson dealing with him at
arm’s length, qualifies as abusive tax avoidance…. Indeed, a specific antiavoidance rule is being used to facilitate abusive tax avoidance.169
In this decision, therefore, the Court applied the GAAR based on a broad interpretation of the
policy underlying the relevant statutory provision.
163
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In Copthorne,170 the Court considered another “surplus stripping” case, involving a series
of transactions including an amalgamation of related companies in manner that duplicated the
equity or “paid-up capital” (PUC) that had been invested in these companies, which allowed the
amalgamated company to distribute corporate surpluses to a non-resident shareholder without
paying non-resident withholding tax on dividends. Explaining that “the PUC scheme of the Act”
is intended to permit the withdrawal of corporate equity without liability for tax “in recognition
of the fact that the initial investment is made with tax-paid funds,”171 the Court held that a
transaction that converted a “vertical” amalgamation of one company and its subsidiary into a
“horizontal” amalgamation of two sister companies abusively circumvented a specific provision
of the ITA that would otherwise have prevented the duplication of each company’s paid-up
capital.172 As a result, although the decision was careful to emphasize that this conclusion was
based on “an examination of the PUC sections of the Act” not upon “some broad statement of
policy, such as anti-surplus stripping, which is not attached to the provisions at issue,”173 the
Court was again prepared to look behind these provisions to discern an underlying policy that the
taxpayer’s transactions contravened.
While the extent to which these decisions will influence lower court GAAR decisions
remains somewhat uncertain, three subsequent cases suggest they have had a discernable impact.
In Gervais v. The Queen,174 where the taxpayer gifted some shares to his spouse on a rollover
basis and realized a gain on a fair market sale of other identical shares to his spouse, who then
realized a gain on the sale of all the shares to an arm’s length person that was computed under a
specific provision of the ITA by averaging the cost of the gifted and purchased shares,175 the
Federal Court of Appeal relied on Lipson to conclude that the attribution to the taxpayer of a
reduced gain on the gifted shares as a consequence of the cost averaging provision was “contrary
to the object, spirit and purpose of [the rollover provision and the attribution rule], the purpose of
which is to ensure that a gain (or loss) deferred by reason of a rollover between spouses or
common-law partners be attributed back to the transferor.”176
In 1245989 Alberta Ltd. v. The Queen,177 where the taxpayer engaged in a series of
transactions that increased the paid-up capital of some shares by averaging them with the paid-up
capital of other shares of the same class, allowing him to distribute corporate surpluses without
any tax, the Tax Court of Canada relied on Copthorne to conclude that the transactions were
contrary to ”the object, spirit and purpose” of a specific anti-avoidance rule intended “to prevent
the removal of taxable corporate surplus as a tax-free return of capital,”178 as well as the statutory
170
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definition of “paid-up capital” which makes specific adjustments to the corporate law concept of
stated capital “to ensure that PUC, calculated and averaged within the class, accurately
represents and is restricted to the funds invested in the shares of the corporation by its
shareholders.”179 Most significantly, the Court emphasized:
Legislation cannot be drafted that captures all eventualities and particular
strategies. In adopting GAAR, Parliament recognized that specific anti-avoidance
rules … often proved to be ineffective in curtailing tax avoidance arrangements
considered by Parliament to be abusive. Too many routes may be taken by the
ingenuity of tax planners to be blocked by specific anti-avoidance rules ….
GAAR was adopted to block abusive arrangements, amongst other things, and to
close the gaps that sophisticated tax plans seek to exploit as here.180
Among other things, the suggestion in this passage that the GAAR can be used to “close …
gaps” is strikingly at odds with earlier statements in in Collins & Aikman181 and Gwartz182 that
the GAAR cannot be used to fill possible gaps left by Parliament.
Finally, and most significantly, is the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Triad Gestco
Ltd. v. Canada,183 which applied the GAAR to deny a capital loss on the grounds that the loss
was “a loss on paper only” that was deliberately created by a series of transactions that generated
a simultaneous accrued gain that the taxpayer could have deferred indefinitely.184 Although the
Court held that the transactions resulted in “an abuse and misuse” of specific provisions of the
ITA that defined allowable capital losses for tax purposes,185 the ultimate basis for the decision
appears to be its conclusion that “[t]he result proposed by the appellant is fundamentally counterintuitive as the capital gain system is generally understood to apply to real gains and real
losses.”186 Indeed, the Court described this as an “overarching policy” that applied irrespective of
the existence of a former specific anti-avoidance rule that would have denied the loss, which was
repealed when the GAAR was enacted on the assumption that the GAAR would “fill the
void”.187
5.

Conclusion

The introduction of the Canadian GAAR in 1988 provides a fascinating example of an
attempt to legislate a particular approach to statutory interpretation in the context of tax
avoidance transactions: a purposive and substantive approach, as opposed to the textual and
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formalist approach that characterized traditional Anglo-Canadian tax jurisprudence. As
experience in Canada since 1988 demonstrates, judicial adoption of this approach has been slow
and at times limited.
Despite the GAAR, Supreme Court of Canada decisions from 1994 to 2005 were not only
unwilling to extend the principles of this new rule to transactions entered into before the
provision came into force, but also rejected the more purposive and substantive approach that the
Court had embraced in the 1980s and early 1990s – as if enactment of a statutory GAAR
confirmed the validity of textualism and formalism, absent the application of this rule. When the
Supreme Court finally ruled on the GAAR in 2005, it was reluctant to accept a radically different
approach, declaring that the ITA is “dominated by explicit provisions dictating specific
consequences, inviting a largely textual interpretation,”188 and emphasizing that the GAAR was
not intended to repeal the Duke of Westminster principle that taxpayers may “manage their
affairs” to minimize taxes payable.189
As a result, although the decision in Mathew demonstrated a willingness to look behind a
specific statutory rule to conclude a transaction had misused its purpose, the Court’s judgment in
Canada Trustco limited the scope of the GAAR by rejecting a broad abuse analysis, limiting this
analysis to “the specific provisions” relied upon by the taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit, and
adopting a “clear and unambiguous” standard for finding an abuse that contradicts the amended
text of subsection 245(4) of the ITA. The effect of this decision is clearly apparent in subsequent
lower court decisions, where courts were reluctant to look behind statutory provisions to find an
underlying statutory scheme and unwilling to apply the GAAR to plug unintended legislative
gaps that allow for abusive tax avoidance.
In contrast to Canada Trustco, the Court’s subsequent decisions in Lipson and Copthorne
were more willing to accept the direction of the GAAR, adopting a broad interpretation of the
purpose of specific provisions as well as the statutory scheme that these provisions comprise.
Although the full effect of these decisions remains to be determined, lower court cases
subsequent to these decisions suggest that courts are now more willing to look behind the text of
statutory provisions to conclude that a provision or scheme has been abused, more willing to
identify a broad policy that transactions may have abused, and more willing to use the GAAR to
fill unintended legislative gaps that tax advisors and their clients are otherwise able to exploit.
Since this was the objective that Parliament sought when it introduced the GAAR, it appears as
though this exercise in legislated statutory interpretation may have been a modest success –
though it took almost 30 years.
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Canada Trustco, supra note 60 at para. 13.
Ibid. at para. 1.
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